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U.S. Law of Attorney-Client
Privilege as Applied to Non-U.S.
Lawyers: A Reciprocity Issue?
Hetty L. Richardson*
In Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. (AM & S) v. Commission of the
European Communities, I the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for the first time
interpreted European Community (EC) 2 law to protect the confidentiality of
written communications between lawyer and client. The ECJ held that such
communications made by an independent lawyer for the purpose of a client's
defense are protected from disclosure to EC officials conducting competition
investigations. 3 However, the ECJ's decision limits the principle of confiden-
* Class of 1985, University of Michigan Law School.
1. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. 264.
2. This note uses the term European Community in accordance with the resolution of the European
Parliament. Resolution on a single designation for the Community, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 63)
36 (1978). The European Community was formed in 1957. Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958). The six original Member States
were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
Denmark, the Irish Republic, and the United Kingdom joined the Community on January 1, 1973.
Greece became the tenth Member State on January 1, 1981. In 1985, Spain and Portugal became
Member States.
3. See AM & S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 323. The dispute in
AM & S began when the member of the Commission of the European Communities responsible for
competition policy ordered the investigation of AM & S, a company incorporated in the United
Kingdom. The Commission requested specified documents some of which AM & S refused to permit
inspection in their entirety. The legal advisers to AM & S argued that some of the documents were
"covered by legal privilege, that is to say, the principle of legal professional privilege or confiden-
tiality as understood in common law jurisdictions." Id. at 1579, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 267. The
documents fell into four broad catagories:
(i) solicitors' instructions to counsel,
(ii) communications between an outside solicitor and an applicant or one of its parent com-
panies containing legal advice or requests for legal advice,
(iii) documents containing legal advice or requests for legal advice from an 'in-house' lawyer
employed by the applicant or one of its parent companies and
(iv) communications between executives of the applicant or one of its parent companies
recording legal advice or request for legal advice.
Id. at 1625, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 277.
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tiality 4 in a way that may have significant consequences for clients who transact
business in Europe and retain lawyers from the United States. 5
The Court stated that the principle of confidentiality applies "without distinc-
tion to any lawyer entitled to practise his profession in one of the Member States,
regardless of the Member State in which the client lives. ' 6 This language appar-
ently extends the protection of the principle of confidentiality only to commu-
nications with lawyers licensed in Community jurisdictions. 7 Thus interpreted,
the principle places the clients of U.S. attorneys in a vulnerable position during
EC competition investigations. European companies doing business in the United
States, U.S. companies operating in Europe, multinationals based on either
continent, and joint ventures between U.S. and European companies all obtain
advice regarding U.S. law from U.S. attorneys. Documents conveying or re-
questing such advice would likely be of interest to Community officials conduct-
ing a competition investigation.' If such communications are not privileged,
clients of U.S. attorneys may be vulnerable to a Commission demand for produc-
tion even if the documents, or the clients themselves, are located in the United
States. 9
Understandably concerned about the potential ramifications of the AM & S
4. The ECJ referred to the protection of communications as a "principle of confidentiality." The
Court arrived at the principle by taking "into account the principles and concepts common to the laws
of Ithe Member] States." AM & S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1610, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at
322.
5. See Vollmer, U.S. Lawyers Excluded from Protection in EEC Cases, Legal Times, July 26,
1982, at 16; see also Boyd, A.M.&.S. and the In-house Lawyer, 7 EUR. L. REV. 493 (1982) (discuss-
ing the effect of the AM & S decision on non-EC lawyers generally and on EC and non-EC, in-house
counsel).
6. AM & S. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1612, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 324.
7. See Section of Int'l Law and Practice, Am. Bar Ass'n, Report to the House of Delegates,
Section of International Law and Practice 1-2 (Jan. 18, 1983) ("AM & S Europe Ltd v. Commission
recognized the existence of a limited attorney-client privilege within European Community law but,
by its literal terms, seems to exclude communications with U.S., and other non-EEC, lawyers from
protection." (footnote omitted)) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report]; see also Vollmer, supra note 5, at
16 ("[The] issue whether the privilege applied to documents from non-EEC lawyers, was directly
before the Court, because AM & S had withheld communications from Australian lawyers .... "); A
European commentator notes that the limitation to the privilege is "made more explicit by the French
text of the Court's Judgment which states that the lawyer must be 'inscrit au barreau de l'un des Etats
membres,' i.e. a member of a bar or law society or equivalent in a Member State and entitled to
practise." Faull, AM & S: The Commission's Practice Note. 8 EUR. L. REv. 411, 411 (1983) (footnote
omitted).
8. See Vollmer, supra note 5, at 16.
9. See id. at 16, 17. The Commission claims it has jurisdiction in competition investigations "not
only over European companies, many of which have U.S. offices or subsidiaries, but also over
foreign undertakings 'whose conduct has an appreciable impact within the common market.'" Id.
(quoting COMM'N OF TIE EUROPEAN COMMUNIrTIES, EuEVEN-rl REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
36 (1982)). Thus, it is at least conceivable that a Commission investigation might involve a U.S.
company operating only in the U.S. and, under a strict interpretation of the AM & S decision, require
the disclosure of attomey-client communiciations.
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decision for clients of U.S. lawyers, the American Bar Association has asked the
Commission of the European Communities to "grant to an undertaking the same
protection . . . against disclosure of written communications with a U.S. lawyer
that Community law accords to a client's written communications with a lawyer
of a Member State of the European Community." 10 Recently, the Commission
has decided to take account of the fact that some non-EC lawyers giving advice in
the EC come from countries that protect attorney-client communications. The
Commission stated that it may be "necessary to negotiate agreements based on
reciprocity with certain countries, with a view to extending legal privilege to
their independent lawyers.""1
The possibility that the Commission might, in the near future, negotiate a
reciprocity agreement with the United States makes timely an examination of the
treatment of communications between non-U.S. attorneys and U.S. clients under
U.S. law.' 2 In a report to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA), the Section of International Law and Practice (ILP) argues that U.S.
law of attorney-client privilege may be invoked to protect communications with
all lawyers, foreign and national. It claims that "U.S. courts and antitrust en-
forcement agencies draw no distinction between U.S. lawyers and foreign law-
yers when faced with a claim of attorney-client privilege; therefore, as a matter of
comity, the Commission should accord clients with confidential communications
to or from U.S. lawyers the same right."'"
Part I of this note considers whether U.S. federal and state law applies the
attorney-client privilege equally to communications with U.S. and non-U.S.
attorneys. It concludes that, contrary to the ILP's position, the law on this issue is
not firm. In light of the policy issues raised by the AM & S decision, part II
considers factors that may justify discriminating between U.S. and non-U.S.
10. ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1.
II. Comm'n of the European Communities, Confidentiality of Legal Documents: Application of
the Competition Rules, BULL. EUR. COMM., No. 6 at 43 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Confidentiality
of Legal Documents]. In 1983, the Commission announced its intention to submit appropriate pro-
posals to the Council of the European Communities to allow for negotiation of such agreements. Id.
12. The U.S. federal attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary privilege recognized by federal
statute which has evolved by means of federal common law. For one formulation of the scope of the
privilege, see UNIF. R. EvID. 502, 13 U.L.A. 249-51 (1974). The evidentiary privilege has a
narrower scope than the ethical obligation of lawyers to protect client confidences. See MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 4-4 (1980).
13. ABA Report, supra note 7, at 9. The ABA Section of International Law and Practice (ILP)
based its reciprocity request to the Commission of the EC on three lines of argument, only the first of
which will be considered in this note. It argued, first, that affording less protection to communica-
tions with U.S. lawyers than to communications with EC lawyers "would deny clients of U.S.
lawyers a right that U.S. courts and antitrust enforcement agencies grant to clients of European
lawyers." Id. at 2. Second, that "discriminating against communications with U.S. lawyers would be
inconsistent with the basic principles declared by the Court in the AM & S decision." Id. Third, that
it "would be contrary to the policies of encouraging trade and friendly relations between the U.S. and
the Member States of the Community." Id. (footnote omitted).
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lawyers, or among non-U.S. lawyers. It concludes that the public interest may be
served best by extending the attorney-client privilege to communications with
some, but not all, non-U.S. lawyers. Part III presents a proposal for defining the
scope of the privilege. The proposal takes into account traditional policies justi-
fying the privilege, while acknowledging and suggesting ways of dealing with
new issues arising as practice by foreign attorneys in the United States increases.
I. U.S. LAW OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: APPLICATION TO
COMMUNICATIONS WITH NON-U.S. LAWYERS
Neither federal nor state law clearly requires that non-U.S. lawyers be treated
like U.S. lawyers for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. While the ILP
states that "[t]he U.S. attorney-client privilege attaches to communications with
lawyers of any jurisdiction," 14 there is a dearth of federal case law supporting
this assertion. The ILP's argument is based largely on unconvincing analogy.
Furthermore, the ILP ignores state law, which is the law of attorney-client priv-
ilege applied by U.S. courts in diversity cases.
A. Federal Law
Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co. ' 5 is the only case in which a federal
court directly addresses the issue of whether the attorney-client privilege applies
to communications with a non-U.S. attorney.' 6 The court allowed a French
company to invoke the privilege, thus preventing the disclosure of written com-
munications between corporate officials and French in-house counsel. The court
held that documents located in both the United States and France were protected
14. Id. at 13.
15. 98 ER.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982).
16. Id. at 444. TWo other cases touch the issue tangentially. See United States v. Bowe, 694 F2d
1256 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Sindona, 636 F2d 792, 804 (2d Cir. 1980). It might be argued
that in both these cases the court assumed that the attorney-client privilege would apply to commu-
nications between a client and a foreign lawyer. However, the fact that the attorneys involved were not
licensed in the United States was not addressed in either opinion. In Bowe, an attorney from the
Bahamas refused to comply with an order to answer a federal grand jury subpoena duces tecum. The
appellate court did not rule on the applicability of the U.S. attorney-client privilege since a lower
court's order to require production only of non-privileged material disposed of the issue. The court
noted that the possiblity of a sanction against the Bahamian attorney for breach of Bahamian attorney-
client privilege was an insufficient reason to quash the subpoena. 694 E2d at 1258.
In Sindona, the court affirmed, on privilege grounds, a district court decision to preclude cross-
examination of a witness based upon a letter inadvertently received by government counsel. The letter
had been prepared by the witness at the request of his Venezuelan attorney, to aid the attorney's
representation of the witness in another proceeding. The court ruled that the attorney-client privilege
applied to the letter. 636 E2d at 804. This case, which is not cited by the ILP, appears to support the
ILP's position. The decision does not indicate, however, that the non-U.S. status of the attorney was
an issue before the court.
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from disclosure under the U.S. law of attorney-client privilege. 17 In determining
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to communications with non-
U.S. lawyers, the court specifically addressed the common law requirement that
a lawyer must be a member of a bar for the privilege to apply. 18
Starting from the determination that the French legal profession has no organi-
zation equivalent to the American bar, the Renfield court held that bar mem-
bership was a functional rather than a literal requirement. If an attorney is
"competent to render legal advice and is permitted by law to do so," ,9 lack of bar
membership will not exclude application of the attorney-client privilege. The
Renfield opinion cited no U.S. case law in support of this functional test.
In its report, the ILP cites a number of cases in support of the proposition that
the attorney-client privilege protects communications with non-U.S. attorneys. 2 0
Most of these cases, however, either involve claims for the protection of commu-
nications with non-U.S. patent agents, 2' or claims for the protection of commu-
nications with U.S. attorneys who have given advice in states in which they are
not licensed to practice law. 22
In the text of its report, the ILP summarizes the cited patent agent cases saying
that the courts "refused to order the production of communications with foreign
17. With regard to documents located in France, the court interpreted the Hague Evidence Covention to
permit non-disclosure if the documents were covered by a privilege recognized either in France or the
United States. Renfield, 98 F. R.D. at 443-44. Assuming that French law would not grant a privilege to
refuse disclosure of the documents, the court decided that the U.S. provided such a privilege. Id. at 444.
The court invoked choice of law principles to determine that the U.S. law of attomey-client privilege
should also be applied to the documents located in the United States. Id. at 444-45.
18. The requirement that a lawyer be amemberof abarcomes from the oft-cited test presented in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), though this case wasnotcited in
the Renfield opinion. The court explained in United Shoe:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of a bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not
waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59 (emphasis added).
19. Renfield, 98 F. R.D. at 444.
20. ABA Report, supra note 7, at 13-15.
21. Id. at 14-15 (citing Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F Supp. 951,953-54 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig. 81 F. R.D. 377, 391-94 (D.D.C. 1978); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, lnc'., 397 F Supp. 1146, 1169-79 (D.S.C. 1974); Mead Digital Sys., lnc. v. A.B. Dick & Co.,
89 E R.D. 318, 320-21 (S.D. Ohio 1980)). The report also cites Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65
F. R.D. 26, 40 (D. Md. 1974), as directly contradicting its proposition.
22. .ABA Report, supra note 7, at 13-14 (citing Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F.
Supp. 249 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Co., 18 F R.D. 463
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 E Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954)).
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patent agents when the law of the foreign country provided a privilege for those
communications." 23 The ILP asserts that this treatment supports the equal ap-
plication of the attorney-client privilege to communications with U.S. and for-
eign lawyers of any jurisdiction. 24 The analogy does not hold up.
First, it is not clear that the policies supporting protection of attorney-client
communications are identical to those supporting protection of patent agent-
client communications. The attorney-client privilege "remains an exception to
the general duty to disclose. . . .It is worth preserving for the sake of a general
policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of truth. It ought to be
strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of
its principle." ' 25 The protection of communications with patent agents is an
extension of the privilege which not all courts choose to undertake. One court has
found that while some degree of confidence may be appropriate between a client
and his foreign patent agent, accountant, banker, or investment advisor, extend-
ing the attorney-client privilege to foreign patent agents would be excessive:
[T]he necessity for "unrestricted and unbounded confidence" between a client and
his attorney which justifies the uniquely restrictive attorney-client privilege simply
does not exist in the other relationships. Expanding the privilege to treat foreign
patent agents as if they are [sic] lawyers improperly expands the privilege beyond
its proper bounds. 
26
Even if the need for confidence were the same, the patent agent cases cited in
the ILP report would not support the assertion that the U.S. law of attorney-client
privilege applies to communications with all foreign attorneys. According to the
report, U.S. courts do not order the production of communications with foreign
patent agents when those communications are privileged under the law of the
foreign country. 27 Even if the cited cases could be so simply characterized, 8 their
23. ABA Report, supra note 7, at 14.
24. Id. at 13-14.
25. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
(footnote omitted).
26. Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 95 F R.D. 27, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
27. ABA Report, supra note 7, at 15 n.54.
28. The cases cited by the ILP do not turn entirely upon the substantive law of foreign jurisdic-
tions. In Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. 111. 1982), the court presented
three theories under which letters from a U.S. client's U.S. attorney to a foreign patent agent would
be privileged. First, if the lawyer merely acted as a conduit between the client and the patent agent,
and if the foreign country protected client-patent agent communications, the communication would
generally be privileged. If the lawyer and patent agent acted together as a conduit between the client
and the foreign patent office, the communication would not be privileged. Second, if the letter
reflected substantive lawyering, and the patent agent acted merely as a functionary, the communica-
tions would be protected as between a lawyer and a non-lawyer under attorney supervision. Third, if
both lawyer and patent agent participated in substantive lawyering, communications would be pro-
tected as between two professionals, or co-counsel. Id. at 954.
The court in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig. 81 F R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978), held that communica-
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 331
application to situations involving foreign attorneys would result not in une-
quivocal protection of communications with all foreign attorneys, but in discrimi-
nation on the basis of the protection afforded attorney-client communications in
foreign jurisdictions.
The ILP draws additional support for its position that U.S. courts will apply
the attorney-client privilege equally to communications with U.S. and non-U.S.
lawyers from cases involving U.S. lawyers who give advice in states other than
those in which they are licensed to practice. 2 9 In Paper Converting Machine Co.
v. FMC Corp., 30 the plaintiff sought production of documents containing written
communications between officers or employees of the defendant and the defen-
dant's lawyer. The lawyer practiced as a patent counsel in California although he
was licensed only in Ohio. The court held that the attorney-client privilege
applied. The defendant's lawyer was "entitled to the status of an attorney" for
purposes of the privilege, despite the fact that he was not admitted to the bar of
the state in which he was employed. 31
tions relating to patent activities in the U.S. could be protected if the patent agent, U.S. or foreign,
was registered with the United States Patent Office. Id. at 391. The communications must also
"involve a response that requires knowledge, analysis, or application of patent law to particular
information." Id. at 394. Communications relating to foreign patent activities could be protected if
the foreign country granted a similar privilege. Id. at 391. The court noted a split in U.S. case law
concerning the protection of client-patent agent communications. Id. at 392.
In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1924), the court ruled that
no communications with patent agents, American or foreign, are protected by an attorey-client
privilege in the United States. Id. at 1169. Communications between foreign clients and foreign patent
agents, relating to foreign patent applications, might be protected out of comity depending upon the
law of the foreign country. Any communications relating to assistance in prosecuting patent applica-
tions in the United States are not privileged. id. at 1170. Foreign patent agent communications which
relate to the development of trial preparation materials are not protected by attorney-client privilege
because "foreign patent agents are not attorneys." Id. at 1171.
The court in Mead Digital Sys., Inc. v. A.B. Dick & Co., 89 F.R.D. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980),
determined that communications between U.S. clients and U.S. patent agents are not protected. It
noted, however, that communications between U.S. clients and foreign patent agents might be
protected if the foreign law affords a privilege which could be observed as a matter of comity. Id. at
320.
The ILP cites Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974), as directly contrary
to the cases supporting its position. The ILP summarized this case as holding that "communications
with no patent agent, U.S. or foreign, is necessarily within the attorney-client privilege." ABA
Report, supra note 7, at 5. In fact, the court held that the attorney-client privilege is available, under
proper conditions, to patent cases. Burlington Indus.. 65 F R.D. at 40.
29. See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 13-14.
30. 215 F Supp. 249 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
31. Id. at 251. The court analyzed each communication for which the privilege was claimed under
the test of United Shoe, 89 F Supp. at 357. In addition, to discussing the subject and nature of
privileged communications, the United Shoe test states that the communications must be made to a
"member of a bar of a court." Id. at 251 (emphasis added) (for the full text of the test, see supra note
18.) The Paper Converting court, however, did not discuss this part of the test explicitly. See 215 F
Supp. at 251.
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In Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 32 a court
considered the issue of whether a lawyer, working as house counsel in a state
other than his licensing state, could be considered an attorney for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege. It held that communications with an attorney practicing
in New York, but only licensed in Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia,
were privileged. 33 The court noted that, given the requirement of re-examination
for bar membership in most states, a contrary rule would deprive multi-state
corporations "of the security of the attorney-client privilege unless counsel de-
votes himself almost entirely to studying for bar examinations." 3 4
The language of both of these cases appears broad enough to extend the
privilege to communications between U.S. clients and foreign attorneys. The
ILP, in fact, states that it has "no reason to believe a court or an antitrust
enforcement agency will apply a different rule to communications with a lawyer
qualified in a foreign country but not admitted to the bar of the state in the
U.S." 35 The holdings of the cases, however, are too narrow to easily support an
analogy to cases involving foreign lawyers. In both cases, the court merely
granted a U.S. attorney licensed by the bar association of one state the protection
of the privilege in another state. It is not clear that the policies that support the
protection of communications with U.S. attorneys practicing out of their licens-
ing states equally support the protection of communications with foreign attor-
neys in the United States.
Some of the communications at issue in the United Shoe case were made to members of the
defendant's patent department who were not members of the bar of the state in which they worked,
but were admitted to other state bars. The court considered this an indication that these individuals
were not acting as attorneys for the defendant and thus did not protect defendant's communications
with them. It did not rule out the possibility of applying the privilege to lawyers from other states:
"The situation would be different with regard to a visiting attorney from another state, for whom the
privilege might well be invoked." United Shoe, 89 E Supp. at 360.
32. 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
33. Id. at 466.
34. Id. The court also noted that the decision in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America did
not require an attorney to be a member of the bar in which he is practicing in order for the attorney-
client privilege to apply. The Zenith decision stated:
Bar membership should properly be of the court for the area wherein the services are ren-
dered, but this is not a sine qua non, e.g., visiting counsel, long distance services by
correspondence, pro hac vice services, "house counsel" who practice law only for the
corporate client and its affiliates and are not for the public generally, for which local au-
thorities do not insist on admission to the local bar.
121 F Supp. 792, 794 (D.Del. 1954). The ILP also cites Zenith. ABA Report, supra note 7, at 14.
35. ABA Report, supra note 7, at 14 (footnote omitted).
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If they are not recognized as attorneys for the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege, non-U.S. in-house counsel of multinational corporations may face
practical problems as difficult as those identified by the the Georgia-Pacific
Plywood court. However, foreign attorneys may or may not come from jurisdic-
tions with privileges similar to the U.S. attorney-client privilege, and they may or
may not be subject to professional discipline. Thus, while members of a state bar
association practicing in another state can be relied on to hold privileged commu-
nications in confidence, there is no guarantee of how foreign lawyers will treat
private communications with their U.S. clients.
The ILP draws additional support for its position from Proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 503, which provides that for purposes of the privilege, "[a] 'lawyer'
is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to
practice in any state or nation." 36 Literal application of this rule would extend the
privilege to communications with all foreign lawyers. The rule is not law, how-
ever. By refusing to adopt this proposed rule and others, Congress "manifested
an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege." 37 Existing Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 provides that "the privilege of a witness, [or] person...
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." 38 Rule
501 is "intended to provide courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege
on a case by case basis." ' 39 Thus, under existing law, federal courts may choose
whether to treat all non-U.S. lawyers like U.S. lawyers, or to limit application of
the privilege to reflect various policy considerations.
In sum, federal law does not firmly establish that the attorney-client privilege
must be applied equally to communications with lawyers of all jurisdictions,
U.S. and foreign. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress leaves the
decision to the courts. Analogies to cases involving non-U.S. patent agents or
out-of-state U.S. lawyers are tenuous at best. If U.S. courts determine for policy
reasons that the law of attorney-client privilege should discriminate between U.S.
and non-U.S. attorneys, or among non-U.S. attorneys, the Federal Rules of
Evidence and current federal case precedent will not hinder them from giving
effect to those policies.
36. PROPOSED FED. R. EviD. 503(a)(2); see also ABA Report, supra note 7, at 13.
37. Trammell v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). In this case, the Court considered whether an
accused could exclude the voluntary testimony of his wife by invoking the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony. Id. at 41-42. The court modified the existing rule to give the witness-spouse alone
the privilege to refuse to testify. Id. at 53. The Court explained that it had authority to modify the
existing rule because Congress, by rejecting nine specific privilege rules and enacting Rule 501,
manifested an intention not to freeze the law of privilege. Id. at 47.
38. FED. R. EviD. 501.
39. 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate).
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B. State Law
Each state formulates its own law of attorney-client privilege. 40 These laws
vary in the protection they afford to communications with non-U.S. lawyers.
Some state statutes, paralleling Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503, apply
the privilege to communications with attorneys authorized to practice in any state
or nation.41 Other states have different policies. In Ohio, the availability of the
privilege is determined by a rule paralleling existing Federal Rule 501. The
privilege is governed "by principles of common law as interpreted by the courts
of [Ohio] in light of reason and experience." 42
In Kansas and New Jersey, the privilege is limited to communications with
lawyers "authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to
practice law in any state or nation the law of which recognizes a privilege against
disclosure of confidential communications between client and lawyer."' 43 Under
the literal language of the Kansas and New Jersey rules, a court would discrimi-
nate among non-U.S. lawyers, selectively protecting communications with law-
yers from countries whose substantive law allowed for the protection of attorney-
client communications. Whether such a court would be satisfied with any type of
attorney-client privilege in the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction, or
would require a privilege similar in scope to one recognized in U.S. state or
federal law, 44 is an open question.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: A JUSTIFICATION FOR DISCRIMINATION?
The AM & S decision provides a fresh perspective from which to examine the
place of foreign lawyers in a domestic system of attorney-client privilege. An
examination of the policies underlying the Community's principle of confiden-
tiality and the limitations placed on that principle is useful in a discussion of
potential developments in the U.S. law of attorney-client privilege as applied to
foreign lawyers.
40. See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 172 (1976). The ILP's report does not discuss state law
regarding the availability of the attorney-client privilege to the clients of non-U.S. lawyers. However,
state law on the issue must be examined when analyzing of the ILP's argument that U.S. courts will
apply the attorney-client privilege to communications with non-U.S. lawyers, not only because state
law will apply to cases brought in state courts, but also because it provides the rule of decision on the
issue of privilege in suits brought under the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. See FED. R. EVID.
501; Eureka Inv. Corp v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 936 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
41. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-503 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §
49.065 (1979); PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 503. Similar language is used in UNiF. R. EVID. 502, 13
U.L.A. 249-51 (1974).
42. Omo R. EvID. 501, OHno REV. CODE ANN. Ev. R. 501 (Page 1981).
43. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426(c)(3) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-20 (West 1976).
44. For one formulation of the scope of the U.S. privilege, see UNIF. R. EVID. 502, 13 U.L.A.
249-51 (1974).
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In enunciating the principle of confidentiality, the ECJ looked to policy consid-
erations common to the laws of the member states of the EC. 45 The Court found
that "confidentiality serves the [requirement].. .that any person must be able,
without constraint, to consult a lawyer whose profession entails the giving of
independent legal advice to all those in need of it." 46 The opinion limits the
principle by at least three conditions, however.47 First, to be protected, commu-
nications between the lawyer and client must be "made for the purpose and in the
interests of the client's rights of defence." 48 Second, such communications must
"emanate from independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not bound to
the client by a relationship of employment." 49 Third, the court implied that only
communications involving lawyers licensed to practice in Member States are
covered. ) 0
When the ECJ emphasized that a client "must be able, without constraint, to
consult a lawyer,"'I it suggested a policy concern which has long been central to
the U.S. law of attorney-client privilege. The purpose of the U.S. privilege is "to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice." 5 2 Indeed, "[t]o induce clients to make such communications, the
privilege... is said by courts and commentators to be a necessity." 53 Promoting
the interests of the client depends upon sound advocacy, and advocacy "depends
upon the lawyer's [sic] being fully informed by the client."
5 4
At no time is the privilege of more importance to clients than when they face
prosecution, civil suit, or investigation by a party adverse to their interests. The
core of the U.S. attorney-client privilege is the protection of communications
made "in contemplation of defense of a pending or imminently threatened pros-
ecution." 55 In such a threatening situation, clients can only be expected to
45. See AM & S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1610, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 322.
46. Id. at 1610, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 323.
47. Some writers have suggested other possible limitations to the EC principle of confidentiality.
See, e.g., Millett, Legal Confidentiality and the European Commission, 126 Souc. J. 532, 533
(1982) (a client's written summary of advice given orally by a lawyer might not be a protected
communication); Usher, Legal Professional Privilege and Confidentiality in EEC Competition Pro-
ceedings; the Judgment of the European Court, 1982 J. Bus. L. 398, 400 (communications from a
lawyer qualified in one Member State, and practicing in another Member State, not under the terms of
the services Directive but by pursuing activities to which access is not restricted, might not be
protected by the principle).
48. AM & S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 323.
49. Id.
50. See id: at 1612, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 324.
51. Id. at 1610, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 323.
52. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
53. United Shoe, 89 E Supp. at 358 (emphasis in original).
54. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
55. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALF. L. REV. 1061,
1062 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
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provide information to their attorneys when they are "free from the consequences
or apprehension of disclosure." 5 6 The AM & S decision may have recognized this
need when it limited the principle of confidentiality to communications made in
"the interests of the client's rights of defence.""
The ECJ's exclusion of communications with non-EC attorneys from the scope
of the principle of confidentiality58 may indicate a desire to avoid encouraging EC
clients to confide in foreign lawyers who may disclose confidential information.
The Commission's willingness to begin negotiations that would apply the princi-
pie's protection to "independent" non-EC lawyers from countries in which the
legal order provides for legal privilege,59 may evidence a desire to extend the
principle of confidentiality only to lawyers who are bound by law to respect client
confidences. Such a limited extension would help to free EC clients of the
apprehension and consequences of the disclosure of confidential communications
before a foreign court.
U.S. law should reflect a similar policy. A law of attorney-client privilege that
assumed all non-U.S. attorneys to be equally likely to protect client confidences
would encourage U.S. clients to confide indiscriminately in any non-U.S. attor-
ney. A client might confide in a non-U.S. lawyer only to find that private infor-
mation could become public record before a foreign tribunal that does not
recognize the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications. Particular clients
might be hesitant to confide in a lawyer again, and clients in general might
become less willing to confide in attorneys. 60 Thus, the purpose of the privilege
would be undermined.
If the privilege of confidentiality "springs essentially from the basic need of
man in a civilized society to be able to turn to his lawyer for advice and help," 6
it is necessary that a client feel certain that his lawyer will not divulge a confiden-
tial communication. In the United States, this certainty is enhanced not only by
an evidentiary privilege, but also by the professional obligation of lawyers to
maintain client confidences. State bar associations discipline lawyers for infrac-
tions of state codes defining this obligation.
62
The possibility of professional discipline, which comes with admittance to a
state bar association, may be a major reason for the common law requirement that
56. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
57. AM & S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 323.
58. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
59. See Confidentiality of Legal Documents, supra note 11, at 43.
60. This argument is based upon the assumption that the grant or denial of protection to commu-
nications with foreign lawyers will affect client behavior. The assumption is, admittedly, speculative.
See infra note 74.
61. AM & S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1654, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 308 (Slynn, Advoc.
Gen., second opinion).
62. For a recent compilation of state ethical codes, see NAT'L CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR Ass'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1980).
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a lawyer be a member of a bar in order to qualify as an attorney for purposes of
the attorney-client privilege. 63 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
on which most state ethics codes are modeled, 64 provides that a lawyer "shall not
knowingly. . .[r]eveal a confidence or secret of his client." 65 A lawyer must not
reveal (1) "information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable
law;" or (2) "other information gained in the professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be ...
likely to be detrimental to the client." 66
Non-U.S. lawyers may not be subject to analogous disciplinary systems. Ap-
plying the attorney-client privilege equally to communications with attorneys of
all foreign jurisdictions may result in harm to U.S. clients whose confidences are
violated by attorneys not required, under their home jurisdictions' ethics codes,
to keep confidences. Again, the willingness of clients to confide in attorneys, the
end that the attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage, would be
undermined.
In delineating the Community's principle of confidentiality, the ECJ held that
advice that may be protected must emanate from "independent" lawyers-"law-
yers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment." 67 The
limitation is based "on a conception of the lawyer's role as collaborating in the
administration of justice by the courts and as being required to provide, in full
independence ...such legal assistance as the client needs." ' 68 This language
suggests two policy concerns. First, lawyers to whom the privilege is extended
ought to be required to serve the interests of the justice system as well as those of
their clients. Second, that those lawyers should be required to exercise indepen-
dent judgment.
Similar policies are reflected in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
According to the Model Code, U.S. lawyers must exercise independent judg-
ment. Each lawyer is required to "preserve a sufficient detachment from his
client's interests so that he remains capable of a sound and objective appraisal of
the propriety of what his client proposes to do. " 69 Lawyers must not "[e]ngage in
63. See supra notes 18 & 31.
64. The ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969. Within three years,
it had been adopted in 40 states. AM. BAR FOUND., ANNcrOED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, at ix n.2. For comparisons of state codes of professional responsibility with the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, see NAT'L CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
62.
65. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(1) (1980).
66. Id. at DR 4-101(A).
67. AM & S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 323.
68. Id. at 1611-12, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 324. The Court continued: "The counterpart of that
protection lies in the rules of professional ethics and discipline which are laid down and enforced in
the general interest by institutions endowed with the requisite powers for that purpose." Id. at 1612,
34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 324.
69. Fuller & Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J.
1159, 1161 (1958).
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conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." 70 A lawyer
must withdraw from the employment of a client when he "knows or it is obvious
that his client is bringing the legal action . . . merely for the purpose of harassing
or maliciously injuring any person."'"
In general, U.S. lawyers must refrain from engaging "in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice." ' 72 According to the Code, "[a]
lawyer should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or
counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor."
73
Applying the U.S. attorney-client privilege to communications with non-U.S.
attorneys not subject to analogous ethical restrictions may encourage client to
consult with lawyers who will not remain sufficiently independent to exercise
detached judgment. It may encourage reliance on the counsel of lawyers not
legally bound to serve the interests of the U.S. justice system.
III. WEIGHING THE POLICIES: A PROPOSAL
Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications with lawyers of
all jurisdictions would assure clients that their confidences, whether shared with
U.S. or foreign attorneys, would be protected in U.S. courts. Furthermore, it
might encourage the EC to extend the principle of confidentiality to communica-
tions with U.S. lawyers. However, the costs of such a policy would likely
outweigh the benefits.
Nondiscriminatory application of the privilege to communications with all
foreign attorneys would encourage the false assumption that all lawyers may be
similarly entrusted with confidential information. Since some non-U.S. lawyers
come from jurisdictions with different attitudes toward attorney-client confiden-
tiality than those embodied in the U.S. system, some clients would inevitably
suffer from the disclosure of private information by non-U.S. attorneys to ad-
verse parties or foreign courts. This result might undermine confidence in attor-
neys generally, the opposite result from what we hope to obtain from an extension
of the attorney-client privilege. In addition, the U.S. justice system might suffer
from the effects of reliance on foreign attorneys who are not sworn to uphold the
interests of that system.
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980).
71. Id. at DR 2-110(B)(I).
72. Id. at DR 1-102(A)(5).
73. Id. at EC 7-5 (footnote omitted). These disciplinary and ethical rules have been "adopted as
binding obligations in some form in all the states and the District of Columbia" and are enforced by
penalties prescribed by individual jurisdictions. ABA Report, supra note 7, at 15. The obligations
"apply whether U.S. lawyers are practicing within their licensing jurisdictions or some other jurisdic-
tion .... " Id. at 16.
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This note recommends that the protection of the U.S. attorney-client privilege
be limited to only to communications with those non-U.S. lawyers who:
(1) are subject to a system of professional discipline that
(a) requires the protection of confidential communications with a client; and
(b) requires attorneys to serve the interests of the justice system in addition to
those of their clients; and
(2) are licensed to practice in any state or nation the law of which recognizes a
form of attorney-client privilege. 14
This limitation of the privilege might be incorporated into federal law in a
number of ways. It might be enacted through a new Federal Rule of Evidence that
defines lawyer in the above manner for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.
Or the limitation might be realized in a gradual manner through court recognition
of some or all of the requirements of a Renfield-type functional analysis.75 The
proposal might also be included in the implementing legislation of a national bar
for foreign lawyers, should one ever be established. Finally, the limitation could
be tested on a small scale through application of the proposal to lawyers regis-
tered to practice before the U.S. Patent Office, 76 or to lawyers and clients in-
volved in federal anti-trust investigations.77
74. Under this proposal, clients are only required to have a reasonable belief that an attorney meets
these criteria for the privilege to apply. At first glance, this seems to put a heavy burden of knowlege
on the client. Yet most clients who consult with non-U.S. attorneys are likely to be "sophisticated"
individuals engaged in international business transactions who will usually be better informed about
the current state of privilege law than the average U.S. client.
This note has argued that limiting the privilege to communications with foreign lawyers likely to
keep confidences will encourage client confidence in lawyers and the legal system by minimizing the
number of incidents of lawyers revealing secrets. Yet, clients relying on foreign lawyers who do not
meet the proposed criteria may see their private communications turned over to a U.S. court. They
may experience a loss of confidence in lawyers in general based on this experience. Without objective
information as to how clients react to the disclosure of their private communications with attorneys or
to changes in privilege law, it is difficult to say with certainty whether this note's proposal will have a
positive net effect.
75. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
76. This might be accomplished through judicial interpretation of 37 C.FR. § 1.341(c), (e) and 37
C.FR. § 1.344. Under 37 C.FR. § 1.341(c), U.S. and foreign attorneys and patent agents may
register with the U.S. patent office to practice before the patent and trademark office. Registered
foreign attorneys must come from countries whose patent offices provide "substantially reciprocal
privileges to those admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office." 37
C.FR. § 1.341(e) (1984). Before any attorney's name will be registered, he or she "must conform to
the standards of ethical and professional conduct set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility
of the American Bar Association as amended February 24, 1970." 37 C.F.R. § 1.344 (1984).
These sections could be amended to explicitely extend the scope of the U.S. attorney-client
privilege to include registered foreign attorneys. They already partially embody the proposal require-
ments concerning professional responsibility and reciprocal privilege.
77. This might be accomplished through an amendment to 15 U.S.C.A. § 1312(c)(1) or 15
U.S.C.A. § 49 (1976).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the AM & S case, the prospect of negotiating an agreement
with the EC regarding the treatment of communications with foreign lawyers
makes timely an examination of the current treatment of communications with
non-U.S. lawyers under U.S. attorney-client privilege law. Contrary to the con-
clusion of the ILP, this is not a settled area of law. The federal attorney-client
privilege does not clearly attach to communications with lawyers of every juris-
diction. Furthermore, laws of the various states differ in the protection each
affords to such communications. Thus, there is much room in U.S. law for
development and change.
Before the United States enters negotiations with the EC, it should consider the
policy ramifications of extending the privilege to all non-U.S. lawyers. In its
articulation of an EC principal of confidentiality, the ECJ suggests factors which
should be considered in the development of U.S. attorney-client privilege law. In
order to safeguard client willingness to confide in attorneys generally, it may be
necessary to limit the definition of "lawyer," for purposes of the privilege, to
lawyers who are subject to professional discipline mandating the preservation of
client confidences, and who come from jurisdictions recognizing a form of
lawyer-client privilege. In order to promote the policies of justice administration,
it may be useful to restrict application of the privilege to lawyers bound to
exercise independent judgment, and required to serve the interests of the justice
system.
The AM & S case has raised immediate concerns about potential discrimination
against the clients of U.S. lawyers during EC competition investigations. Yet the
ECJ, in its articulation of a new principal of confidentiality, may have offered
new avenues for the development of U.S. attorney-client privilege law.
